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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
French foreign policy combines support for 
democracy and human rights with a strong 
Realpolitik dimension. Development assis-
tance increasingly funds human rights and 
governance-related activities, primarily in 
France’s former colonies. France is also very 
willing to use military intervention to counter 
authoritarian regimes and prevent violations 
of human rights and democracy, most re-
cently in Mali and the Central African Repub-
lic. France has provided support for demo-
cratic electoral processes in countries such 
as Guinea and Madagascar. It has also been 
a firm supporter of the rebels in Syria against 
the abuses of President Bashar al-Assad.
However, among repressive regimes 
with which France has close historical ties, 
the government tends to engage rather than 
criticize. For example, France has supported 
the undemocratic leadership of Algeria and 
Morocco, even going out of its way to repair 
strained relations. In addition, France’s con-
tract to sell Mistral warships to Russia has 
been highly controversial given events in 
Ukraine and the backing of France’s allies  
for strong sanctions against Russia. 
Introduction1
France has a foreign policy with global interests 
and is involved diplomatically in developments in 
every part of the world. The 1789 Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen is among the 
inspirations for the diplomacy of the current French 
state. But French foreign policy also has a Realpolitik 
dimension that at times clashes with democratic 
principles. French policy thus reflects two extremes: 
support for democracy in some cases, and strong 
protection of the national interest in others. 
The promotion of democracy and human rights has 
become increasingly important for French diplomats 
in the context of a globalized world. More than ever, 
French governments are inclined to consider that 
values, not just interests, matter in foreign policy 
as a source of legitimacy. This evolution has clear 
consequences for both the soft and hard power of 
France. The country takes seriously debates at the 
United Nations, which it sees as the place where 
democracy and human rights issues should be dis-
cussed. The old Gaullist line that the United Nations 
is just a “thingamajig” has been set aside. 
Meanwhile, France still considers military interven-
tion as a legitimate means for countering authoritar-
ian regimes and preventing violations of democracy 
and human rights. France at times has been aggres-
sive in confronting dictatorships and supporting 
democratic opposition. France also has implement-
ed sanctions in response to breaches of democracy, 
mostly in the European Union (EU) context. 
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In development policy, France continues to focus its 
actions mainly (though not exclusively) on former 
French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, some of 
which are under authoritarian control.  Where France 
has close historical ties, the government usually 
prefers engagement with, rather than criticism of, 
repressive regimes. 
Foreign Policy Objectives
In principle, the current Socialist government 
is more willing than its predecessors to call for 
improved human rights conditions in its diplomatic 
relations. President François Hollande, elected in 
May 2012, has declared that “the time of França-
frique is over,”2 referring to the past French policy 
of supporting authoritarian regimes in Africa solely 
for economic reasons. Nevertheless, the Hollande 
administration often emphasizes France’s strategic 
interests, which are especially dominant when they 
relate to the fights against terrorism and extremism. 
As a candidate, Hollande outlined 60 priorities for 
his administration. Priority 57 on a renewal of French 
multilateral diplomacy and priority 58 on relations 
with Africa broadly reflect his main foreign policy 
ideas. Hollande said that partnerships with Middle 
East and North African countries will be built on 
economic, democracy, and cultural projects, in 
direct response to the Arab Spring.3
Hollande’s inaugural address on May 15, 2012, 
provided further detail on his ideas for supporting 
human rights and democracy in foreign policy. His 
five-year term in office was presented as a period 
during which France must uphold the principles of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as much 
as possible: personal freedoms, women’s rights, the 
fight against political repression, and humanism are 
all presented as priorities for French diplomacy in 
the period 2012–17.4 France also outlines its own 
path for democracy support and human rights based 
on healthcare diplomacy (support to UNITAID), as 
well as bilateral economic and financial support to 
the least developed countries. France insists that 
the integration of democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights should be supported within UN  
multilateral policies. 
In practice, France continues to lend support to 
undemocratic regimes, especially in Africa. Its inter-
vention against militant jihadists in January 2013 in 
support of the Malian regime, which had come to 
power through a military coup, is a prime example. 
Hollande has called for democracy and transparency 
in the authoritarian regime in Algeria, but continues 
the tradition of his predecessors of maintaining sta-
ble relations due to the strong historical connection 
between the two countries.5
France also continues to turn a blind eye to rights 
abuses by Moroccan authorities, including in the 
disputed territory of Western Sahara. France has 
described Morocco as “an intimate, very close  
partner,”6 with which it has strong historic and  
economic ties. Relations between Morocco and 
France have been tense since early 2014, when 
French-Moroccan activists filed lawsuits against 
Morocco’s intelligence chief, prompting an investi-
gation into his alleged involvement in the torture of 
prisoners in Morocco. Rather than supporting the 
call against torture, Hollande reportedly called  
the Moroccan king in February 2014 “to send a  
message of confidence and friendship.”7 
Development Assistance and Trade 
Development assistance, both multilateral and  
bilateral, is implemented by the French Develop-
ment Agency (AFD), a public agency that is part 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Development. The AFD carries out programs in close 
connection with French embassies and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs). Although President 
Hollande’s campaign speeches emphasized its 
interest in working with Arab countries, most AFD 
programs are still oriented toward sub-Saharan Africa.
The AFD increasingly works directly with NGOs, 
which are selected based on their use of local 
resources and their local impact. Its emphasis on 
a participatory approach is a major development in 
contrast to 10 years ago, when France implemented 
development projects directly with governments, of 
which most were African. In 2013, the areas of hu-
man rights, governance, education for development, 
and creation of associative networks represented 
44 percent of AFD projects managed by NGOs.8 
According to the AFD’s strategic plan for 2012–16, 
one of the four aims of French support to NGOs is 
promotion of democratic governance and human 
rights as recognized by the French state and inter-
national conventions.9 Priority countries include 17 
former colonies in Africa, as well as some in North 
Africa and the Middle East. Projects support the rule 
of law, respect for human rights, the fight against 
corruption, and effective governance.10 
France rarely emphasizes human rights and democ-
racy issues in trade deals. The country has a strong 
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defense industry that is a major source of its global 
exports. Local employment is directly dependent on 
these weapon sales and is prominent in the public 
eye. Moreover, a weak French economy has led 
politicians to push for stronger international trade 
regardless of the partner. 
For this reason, the French government has not giv-
en up the controversial plan to sell two Mistral-class 
warships to Russia, despite Russia’s 2014 invasion of 
Crimea and Russian support for violent separatists 
in eastern Ukraine. Signed in 2011 under former 
president Nicolas Sarkozy, the Mistral contract is 
worth €1.2 billion ($1.7 billion) and includes a large 
penalty for breach of contract if France fails to 
deliver the ships. More than 1,000 French jobs are 
also linked to completion of the contract.11 [Editor’s 
note: In September 2014, France postponed delivery 
of the warships due to Russia’s actions undermin-
ing security in Europe, although it did not cancel 
the contract.] Similarly, France supports a flexible 
interpretation of the EU arms embargo that has 
been in place against China since the crackdown on 
Tiananmen Square in 1989, and continues to export 
technology that has some military applications.12 
Elections
Despite the global reach of French foreign policy, in 
practice, French electoral observation concentrates 
on sub-Saharan Africa. Most of this takes place 
through electoral observation missions run by inter-
national organizations such as the United Nations, 
the EU, or the Organization for Security and Co-op-
eration in Europe. In general, France rarely responds 
to an election beyond making statements—what 
is referred to as “discursive diplomacy”—on human 
rights. However, France has often criticized election 
fraud and manipulation. 
For example, in the Republic of Guinea, parliamenta-
ry elections on September 28, 2013, demonstrated 
steady progress in the electoral system. However, 
the EU, after an election mission supported by 
France, noted infringements on democracy and 
human rights immediately following the elections, 
including illegal detentions, violations of freedom of 
speech, and cases of torture.13 
In Mali, parliamentary elections of November– 
December 2013 led to a long list of EU recom-
mendations that France likewise supported. These 
included reform of the electoral system through  
creation of new constituencies, clarification of rules 
for incumbent officers to be candidates, and a  
redefinition of the role of political parties within the 
political landscape.14 France also considered the 
January 2013 military intervention to be linked to 
the July 2013 presidential elections. As Hollande 
said in May 2013, “We must ensure Mali’s authorities 
can actually have control over the territory, in order 
to organize these elections everywhere. No part of 
Mali can be detached from the electoral process.”15
In Madagascar, France supported the August 2013 
decision of a new electoral court that addressed 
the list of candidates for the December presidential 
election. Madagascar had been facing a protracted 
political crisis since a military coup in 2009. The 
court decision canceled the candidacies of both the 
coup leader and the wife of the ousted president, 
both of whom had been prolonging a stalemate over 
holding the first post-coup elections. The French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the court deci-
sion “represents significant progress in the process 
to resolve the crisis in Madagascar, which must 
involve the holding of free, transparent, and credible 
elections.”16 The December election was peaceful 
and the EU did not report widespread fraud.
In response to the campaign process in Egypt that 
led to the election of Mohamed Morsi in June 2012, 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized 
the need for a peaceful environment and for legal 
protection of freedom of speech. France also regu-
larly denounced inappropriate use of force against 
protesters during the electoral campaign.
Disruptions of Democratic Processes
French diplomats have responded to disruptions of 
democratic processes in several countries in recent 
years, but have also been hesitant when economic 
interests were at stake.
France took an active position in the UN Security 
Council to gain support for unilateral military inter-
vention in Mali in January 2013. When French in-
telligence provided evidence of progress of militant 
jihadist groups from Northern Mali toward the cap-
ital city, Bamako, Hollande determined that military 
intervention was the best option to stop them. After 
a bombing and ground offensive, France fostered 
support from the UN Security Council in April 2013 
to deploy a peacekeeping force in Mali.
In 2013 and early 2014, France again determined 
that international mobilization, and ultimately uni-
lateral military intervention, was necessary, this time 
in the Central African Republic. Sectarian killings 
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prompted a fear of civil war between the Muslim 
and Christian communities and of the potential for 
violent anarchy. In August 2013, President Hollande 
called for the African Union and the UN Security 
Council to address the situation.17 In December 
2013, France called for reinforcement of the Afri-
can-led International Support Mission in the Central 
African Republic and decided to intervene with its 
own troops in Operation Sangaris. The following 
month, France proposed to its EU partners the 
launch of Operation EUFOR RCA, which began its 
first mission in April led by French major general 
Philippe Pontiès. Thus, France has played a key role 
at all stages of military intervention in Africa.
Throughout the past two years, France has period-
ically condemned the political situation in Egypt. 
Criticism increased after the army’s July 2013 arrest 
of President Mohamed Morsi, legally elected in June 
2012. In August 2013, President Hollande voiced 
support for setting up a new democratic electoral 
process in Egypt.18 France has also supported the 
action plans of the European External Action Service 
(the EU’s diplomatic corps) to enhance political  
dialogue and the protection of human rights in 
Egypt. France’s stance is that the Egyptian govern-
ment’s efforts at democracy must be supported 
through the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
After two attempted military coups in Comoros in 
April and May 2013, France joined the European 
External Action Service statement calling for respect 
of democratic values.19 However, Comorian political 
leaders have alleged that French mercenaries were 
involved in the military coups, and have launched 
legal procedure in a French court. These allegations 
are not without precedent; French mercenaries have 
been involved in African coups in the past. 
Violence against protestors in Ukraine in 2014, 
mostly perpetrated by the government of then-pres-
ident Viktor Yanukovych, as well as the subsequent 
Russian invasion of Crimea and Russian support for 
violent separatists in eastern Ukraine, have led the 
EU to contentious discussions of sanctions against 
Ukrainian and Russian individuals responsible for 
breaches of democratic process and civil liberties. 
While the Hollande administration supports an 
independent Ukraine in face of Putin’s politics of 
hegemony, and France has accepted limited EU 
sanctions, France does not support strong sanctions 
against Russia due to its extensive economic ties. 
France is second only to Germany among Russia’s 
largest foreign investors.20 [Editor’s note: France did 
support the tighter sanctions that the EU imposed 
on Russia in July 2014.]
Gross Human Rights Violations
France has developed an active role within the 
United Nations, its primary place of focus for human 
rights diplomacy. France defined a political agenda 
for its candidacy to the UN Human Rights Council, 
to which it was elected in November 2013. Gérard 
Araud, French permanent representative to the 
United Nations, has said that the notion of “responsi-
bility to protect” must be redefined by strengthening 
international law.21 In an effort to improve account-
ability, President Hollande has called for a code of 
conduct to end what France considers the reckless 
use of veto power in the UN Security Council and 
the resulting failure to end serious violations.22 
Hollande’s suggestion came at the end of a speech 
detailing numerous world challenges, the first of 
which was the civil war in Syria.23 France was the 
first country to recognize the Syrian opposition in 
November 2012. In September 2013, France was 
prepared to engage in military action against the 
Assad regime, but renounced the idea due the refus-
al of the United States and the United Kingdom to 
participate in a military coalition. France has broken 
diplomatic relations with Syria and recalled its am-
bassador to Damascus. The Syrian ambassador in 
Paris also has been expelled, although she may  
remain because of her accreditation with Paris-based 
UNESCO. France now supports the installation in 
Paris of an ambassador representing the Syrian 
opposition and is helping to fund an embassy.
In contrast, France has shied away from further 
military intervention in Libya after the Sarkozy 
administration played a key role in NATO’s campaign 
to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011. While 
France makes regular statements against ongoing 
violence in Libya,24 Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius 
announced in February 2014 that France had ruled 
out Western military action.25 
France has engaged in a global campaign against 
the death penalty, calling for an international mor-
atorium in November 2012. Every French embassy 
has been requested to hold international forums  
and conferences, and to support public diplomacy 
by NGOs.26 
At the EU level, France has supported mediation by 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and by the 
European External Action Service to ease several 
France
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dramatic political situations around the world. By 
supporting EU diplomacy, France is able to project 
its interests further. 
Civil Liberties
The protection of freedom of expression and free 
media was at the core of the French international 
agenda in 2012 and 2013. French policy was defined 
after Paris-based NGO Reporters Without Borders 
reported that 88 journalists were killed globally in 
2012.27 In a speech on May 3, 2012, the spokesper-
son at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 
France will consistently speak out when journalists 
are victims of violence, condemning the crimes and 
calling for justice.28 UN Ambassador Araud declared 
on July 17, 2013, that the international community 
must work to provide journalists sufficient protec-
tion to accomplish their “democratic mission.”29
France supported the European External Action Ser-
vice’s condemnation of the May 2014 arrests and de-
tentions in China of human rights activists marking 
the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square mas-
sacre.30 It regularly supports other EU statements on 
human rights in China as well. However, France itself 
rarely condemns Chinese crackdowns on civil liber-
ties, preferring to emphasize the positive aspects of 
French-Chinese economic cooperation. In a speech 
in Nanjing in February 2014, Foreign Minister Fabius 
obliquely said, “Sometimes, these two great coun-
tries can have different approaches. . . . I’m thinking 
of certain international issues. I’m also thinking of 
the issue of human rights, where different historical 
trajectories have produced different sensibilities: 
nobody should force their views upon anyone else, 
but we believe that certain principles and rights are 
universal and should benefit every woman and every 
man in every country.”31
Marginalized Communities
France hosts the second-largest number of refu-
gees and asylum seekers in the EU, after Germany. 
In 2013, 13 percent of the total candidates who 
obtained the status of refugee or asylum seeker in 
the EU were in France. In 2013, one in four refugee 
candidates gained legal status.32 This openness is 
new since the left-wing government came to power. 
Refugee status allows the beneficiary to work and to 
receive social welfare in France. Refugees in France 
come from countries such as Syria, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Russia, and Albania.33
The French public has a general sympathy for  
Christians from the Middle East, supported by 
Christian churches but also by parliamentarians 
and the media. This stems from the close historical 
links that France has built with these communities, 
especially in Lebanon and Syria. In his meeting with 
the president of the Conference of French Catholic 
Bishops on October 7, 2013, President Hollande 
publicly expressed his concern about the future of 
these communities in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and the  
Palestinian territories. The French president de-
clared that France has the clear wish to support all 
the Christians from the Middle East.34 During his visit 
to Israel and the Palestinian territories in November 
2013, President Hollande reiterated that there is 
nothing worse “than imagining that the Middle East 
could be a land where Christians could no longer live 
in peace.”35 As a consequence, the French refugee 
agency has been keen to support refugee status for 
Christian Syrians escaping the civil war.
Since France passed a law in May 2013 legalizing 
same-sex marriage, French diplomacy has been 
more supportive of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-
gender rights abroad. In January 2014, for instance, 
the foreign ministry criticized a bill in Nigeria to 
criminalize same-sex relationships.36 
Gender equality is not a primary area of focus for 
French foreign policy, although diplomats make 
occasional statements in support of equality issues. 
The AFD is in the process of finalizing a strategy on 
gender and development.37
France continues to issue statements in response  
to the killings of ethnic Rohingya in Myanmar, includ-
ing acknowledging a Human Rights Watch report 
that referred to the violence as ethnic cleansing.38 
President Hollande raised the topic in a meeting 
with Burmese president Thein Sein in July 2013. In 
that meeting, Hollande also mentioned that France 
supports everyone who is working for democracy 
and respect of human rights in Myanmar.39
Tibetan rights activists were encouraged that  
Hollande reportedly raised the topic of human rights 
with Chinese president Xi Jinping on an April 2013 
visit whose primary purpose was to improve eco-
nomic relations; the visit came just after two Tibetan 
monks had set themselves on fire to protest China’s 
policy in Tibet.40 However, despite encouragement 
by various NGOs and French parliamentarians,41  
Hollande did not explicitly raise the topic of Tibet 
during President Xi’s visit to France the following 
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year, in March 2014. France hosted a visit by the 
Dalai Lama most recently in 2011.
Nor has France spoken openly against China’s treat-
ment of the Uighurs, who face religious repression, 
crackdowns on peaceful protestors, imprisonment, 
and torture. After terrorist attacks occurred in March 
and May 2014 that were blamed on Uighur sepa-
ratists, France issued statements condemning the 
violence and expressing solidarity with the govern-
ment and the Chinese people.42
ENDNOTES
1. The author would like to thank Luis Garcia Espinal,  
intern at Center for International Studies and Research,  
for his research assistance.
2. A. R., “We Can’t Help Coming Back,” The Economist,  
July 15, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
baobab/2014/07/france-africa.
3. François Hollande, “Le changement c’est maintenant:  
mes 60 engagements pour la France,” (“The Change  
Is Now: My 60 Commitments for France”), Manifesto  
for the Presidential Election, 2012, http://manosque. 
parti-socialiste.fr/files/les-60-engagements-pour-la 
-france-de-francois-hollande.pdf.
4. François Hollande, Inauguration Speech, Paris,  
Embassy of France in Washington, May 15, 2012, 
http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article3469.
5. Robert Zaretsky, “France, Algeria, and the Ties  
That Bind (op-ed),” New York Times, May 28, 2013,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/opinion/ 
global/france-algeria-and-the-ties-that-bind.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
6. Sabah Lebbar, “Morocco-France, an Enduring  
Win-Win Partnership,” North Africa Post, April 3, 2013,  
http://northafricapost.com/3251-morocco-france- 
an-enduring-win-win-partnership.html.
7. John Irish, Elizabeth Pineau, and Chine Labbe,  
“France’s Hollande Steps in to Calm Row with Morocco,” 
Reuters, Paris, February 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2014/02/25/us-france-morocco-idUS-
BREA1O0XG20140225.
8. “Annual Report 2013,” French Development Agency,  
p. 38, http://www.afd.fr/webdav/shared/PUBLICATIONS/ 
INSTITUTIONNEL/rapports-annuels/annual- 
report-afd-2013.pdf.
9. “Les subventions de l’AFD aux projets d’ONG” (“The AFD 
Grants to NGO Projects”), French Development Agency, 
http://www.afd.fr/home/AFD/nospartenaires/ONG/ 
collaborations/les-subventions-de-l-afd-aux-projets-ONG.
10. “Les priorités géographiques et thématiques de l’AFD 
 au financement des initiatives des ONG” (“Geographic 
and Thematic Priorities of the AFD to Finance NGO  
Initiatives”), French Development Agency,  
http://www.afd.fr/home/AFD/nospartenaires/ONG/ 
collaborations/les-subventions-de-l-afd-aux-projets-ONG/
les-priorites-geographiques-et-thematiques-de-l-AFD- 
au-financement-des-initiatives-ONG.
11. “Mistral Blows: Why France Insists on Going Ahead with 
Selling Warships to Russia,” The Economist, May 17, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/ 
21602291-why-france-insists-going-ahead-selling- 
warships-russia-mistral-blows.
12. “EU Arms Embargo on China,” Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/databases/
embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/china.
13. “Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union européenne 
en République de Guinée, Rapport final, élections légis-
latives” (“Electoral Observation Mission of the European 
Union to the Republic of Guinea, Final Report, Parlia-
mentary Elections”), Election Observation Mission of the 
European Union, September 28, 2013, http://eeas.europa.
eu/eueom/missions/2013/guinea/pdf/moeue-guinee-rap-
port-final-20012014_fr.pdf.
14. “Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union européenne 
au Mali, Rapport final, élections législatives 2013” 
(“Electoral Observation Mission of the European Union 
to Mali, Final Report, Parliamentary Elections”), Election 
Observation Mission of the European Union, November 
24, 2013 and December 15, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/
eueom/missions/2013/mali/pdf/rapport-final-recomman-
dations-legislatives-mali-2013_fr.pdf.
15. M. François Hollande, Speech at Mali/Donors’ Conference, 
France in the United States: Embassy of France in  
Washington, Paris, May 15, 2013, http://ambafrance-us.
org/spip.php?article4235.
16.  “Madagascar: Electoral Court’s Decision,” French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and International Development, August 
19, 2013, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/
madagascar-273/events-6076/article/madagascar- 
electoral-court-s.
17. François Hollande, “21st Ambassadors’ Conference, 
Speech by M. François Hollande, President of the Repub-
lic,” Presidency of the French Republic, August 27, 2013, 
http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/21st-ambassa-
dors-conference-speech-by-m-francois-hollande-presi-
dent-of-the-republic/.
18. Press conference of François Hollande and the Saudi Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2013, http://tempsreel.
nouvelobs.com/monde/20130818.OBS3530/egypte-hol-
lande-juge-le-niveau-des-violences-pas-acceptable.html/.
19.  “Déclaration de l’UE sur la tentative de coup d’état aux 
Comores” (EU Statement on the Attempted Coup in  
Comoros”), Delegation of the European Union to the  
Republic of Mauritius, for the Union of the Comoros  
and the Republic of Seychelles, April 29, 2013,  
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mauritius/press_
corner/all_news/news/2013/20130429_comores.htm.
20. Carol Matlack, “Why France Inc. Is Still Going to  
Putin’s Economic Summit,” Bloomberg Businessweek, 
May 7, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/arti-
cles/2014-05-07/why-france-inc-dot-is-still-going- 
to-putins-economic-summit.
21. See Ambassador Araud’s Speech at the “Dialogue inter-
actif informel sur la responsabilité de protéger,” Perma-
nent Representation of France to the UN in New York, 
September 11, 2013, http://www.franceonu.org/la-france-
a-l-onu/espace-presse/interventions-en-seance-publique/
autres-instances/article/11-septembre-2013-dialogue.
France
6
22. “François Hollande Addresses UN General Assembly,” 
France in the United Kingdom, Embassy of France in 
London, September 24, 2013, http://www.ambafrance-uk.
org/Francois-Hollande-addresses-UN.
23. Ibid.
24. Latest News: Libya, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Development, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
en/country-files/libya/.
25. “France Rules Out Libya Military Intervention,” Al Arabiya 
News, February 10, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/
News/africa/2014/02/10/France-rules-out-Libya- 
military-intervention-.html.
26. See the file “Campaign for the Abolition of Death Penalty,” 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy-1/
human-rights/death-penalty/france-and-death-penalty/.
27. “Press Freedom Barometer: Journalists Killed, 2012,” 
Reporters Without Borders, http://en.rsf.org/press-free-
dom-barometer-journalists-killed.html?annee=2012.
28. Romain Nadal, “La protection des journalistes dans les 
conflits armés” (“The Protection of Journalists in Armed 
Conflict”), Permanent Representation of France to the 
UN in New York, May 3, 2012, http://www.franceonu.org/
la-france-a-l-onu/espace-presse/interventions-en- 
seance-publique/autres-instances/article/3-mai-2012- 
la-protection-des-6210.
29. “Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflict,” Permanent 
Mission of France to the United Nations in New York,  
July 17, 2013, http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-
united-nations/press-room/statements-at-open-meetings/ 
security-council/article/17-july-2013-security-council. 
30. “Statement on the Recent Wave of Arrests and  
Detentions in China,” European External Action 
Service, May 28, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2014/140528_01_en.pdf.
31. “China: Statement by Mr. Laurent Fabius, Minister of  
Foreign Affairs, at the University of Nankai,” French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, 
February 24, 2014, http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ 
exl-doc/EPJ00279109.pdf.
32. Steffen Angenendt, Marcus Engler, and Jan Schneider,  
“European Refugee Policy: Pathways to Fairer  
Burden-Sharing,” SWP Comments, no. 36, Berlin,  
November 2013. 
33. “No Explosion of Asylum Seekers Figures in France, NGO,” 
RFI, November 1, 2013, http://www.english.rfi.fr/afri-
ca/20131101-no-explosion-asylum-seekers 
-figures-france-ngo.
34. “François Hollande s’inquiète du sort des chrétiens 
d’Orient” (“François Hollande is concerned about the 
fate of Christians of the East”), L’Œuvre d’Orient,  
October 9, 2013, http://www.oeuvre-orient.fr/2013/10/09/
francois-hollande-sinquiete-du-sort-des-chretiens-dorient.
35. Laurent Zecchini, “A Jérusalem-Est, Hollande face aux 
craintes des chrétiens palestiniens” (“In East Jerusalem, 
Hollande faces the fears of Palestinian Christians”),  
Le Monde, November 18, 2013.
36. “Promulgation d’une loi contre l’homosexualité”  
(Promulgation of a law against homosexuality”),  
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International  
Development, January 14, 2013, http://www.diplomatie.
gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/nigeria/la-france-et-le-nigeria/
evenements-4120/article/nigeria-promulgation-d-une-loi. 
37. “Prise en compte du genre dans les interventions de l’AFD” 
(“Consideration of Gender in AFD work”), French  
Development Agency, http://www.afd.fr/home/AFD/ 
developpement-durable/DD-et-operations/droits- 
humains-genre-developpement/genre-et-developpement.
38. “Birmanie: Rapport de Human Rights Watch” (“Myanmar: 
Human Rights Watch Report”), French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Development, April 22, 2013, 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/birmanie/ 
la-france-et-la-birmanie/evenements-14386/article/ 
birmanie-rapport-de-human-rights; “Birmanie: Situation  
dans l’Etat d’Arakan” (“Myanmar: Situation in Rakhine 
State”), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Development, February 12, 2014,  
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/birmanie/ 
la-france-et-la-birmanie/evenements-14386/article/bir-
manie-situation-dans-l-etat-d.
39. “Birmanie: Communiqué de la présidence de la  
République” (“Myanmar: Communiqué of the Presidency 
of the Republic”), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Development, July 17, 2013, http://basedoc.
diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-doc/EPJ00198502.pdf. 
40. “French President Hollande Talks of Human Rights during 
China Visit,” Students for a Free Tibet International, April 
26, 2013, https://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/news/ 
hollande-tibet-with-chinas-new-leadership.
41. “Chine: François Hollande devrait soulever la question  
des droits humains lors de sa visite dans ce pays”  
(“China: Hollande Should Raise the Issue of Human Rights 
during His Visit to the Country”), Human Rights Watch, 
April 22, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2013/04/22/
chine-francois-hollande-devrait-soulever-la-question 
-des-droits-humains-lors-de-sa-v.
42. “Chine - Attentat - Déclaration du porte-parole du 
ministère des affaires étrangères” (China - Attack -  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Statement”), 
March 1, 2014, http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-doc/
EPJ00280318.pdf. 
www.freedomhouse.org
Freedom House
7
Supporting Democracy 
Abroad: An Assessment  
of Leading Powers
France
Freedom House is a nonprofit,  
nonpartisan organization that  
supports democratic change,  
monitors freedom, and advocates  
for democracy and human rights.
1301 Connecticut Ave. NW., Floor 6
Washington D.C. 20036
www.freedomhouse.org
202.296.5101
info@freedomhouse.org
120 Wall Street, 26th floor
New York, NY 10005
8
